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THE PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY*
PAUL A. FREUND**
I.
The title of this series of lectures is "The Quest for Equality," or, as it
appeared earlier, "Toward Equality." I begin by questing for meaning
in "The Quest for," in the style of the Oxford examination in Philoso-
phy: "Question One. What exactly is meant by 'Question One'?" The
first question to ask is the one put by Erik Erikson to a student who
accosted him with the excited statement, "Professor, I am having an
identity crisis!" To which the Professor replied, "Are you complaining
or boasting?"
If, as I surmise, our title is modestly boastful, it is only fair to recall
that for twenty-five hundred years some of our most admired thinkers
have recited a litany to inequality. Plato and Aristotle placed slaves
and barbarians beyond the pale of equal treatment, though in a sense
this statement really opens up a basic issue in any discussion of equal-
ity, for if, as was believed, slaves and barbarians were inferior by na-
ture, then a principle of equal treatment was in fact honored, namely
that every person was to be treated in accordance with his nature. Une-
quals were to be treated unequally, a principle not so different from
modern egalitarian philosophy except that the Greeks, lacking the ad-
vantage of reading Rawls,' did not regard the appropriate difference-
principle to be necessarily one by which the most advantageous treat-
ment should be accorded the group worst off in the social scale. Even
John Locke, philosopher of the English Revolution and by derivation
the American, proposed special schools for the children of paupers, so
they would learn labor "and nothing but labour." The issue is over
the concept of proportionate treatment-proportionate to essence, lead-
ing to stability, as with Plato; or proportionate to existence, leading to
* A lecture delivered at Washington University on November 1, 1978, as the first in a series
On he Quest for Equalio .
** Carl M. Loeb University Professor Emeritus, Harvard Law School. A.B., 1928, Washing-
ton University- LL.B., 1931. S.J.D., 1932, Harvard University.
I J. RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
2 J BLUM, THE BURDEN OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (1978).
Washington University Open Scholarship
12 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
movement, as with Rawls; or proportionate to intrinsic need, as when
in quest of health a hospital treats patients equally by giving sugar to
hypoglycemics and withholding it from hyperglycemics.
This has been a digression from the litany of voices praising inequal-
ity, though in a deeper sense what has just been said is a glimpse into
the central problems of a philosophy of equality, the problems of rele-
vant groupings, to which I shall return. But to continue the litany: the
medieval churchmen in Europe espoused the notion of hierarchy
among mortals, within the church and among the laity, on the model of
the angels themselves.' Shakespeare put the case for hierarchy and de-
gree as the essential foundation of both physical and social order in
Troilus and Cressida (Act I, Scene 3), nominally about ancient Greece
but, as always, inspired by the glories of Elizabethan England:
The heavens themselves, the planets and this centre,
Observe degree, priority and place,
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
Office and custom, in all line of order:...
* . . 0, when degree is shaked,
Which is the ladder to all high designs,
The enterprise is sick! How could communities,
Degrees in schools and brotherhoods in cities,
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
The primogenitive and due of birth,
Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,
But by degree, stand in authentic place?
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, hark, what discord follows!
Among the philosophers, even Kant, the source of much of modern
formal egalitarian philosophy, said in criticism of Rousseau that ine-
quality is a "rich source of much that is evil, but also of everything that
is good."4
On this side of the Atlantic, when the egalitarian moral sentiment of
the Declaration of Independence began to be translated into political
action in the movement for a widened suffrage in the 1820's, fearful
alarms were sounded. In New York Chancellor Kent prophesied
doom: "My opinion is that the admission of universal suffrage and a
licentious press are incompatible with government and security to
3. Lakoff, Christianiy and Equality, in EQUALITY 115 (NoMos IX, J. Pennock & J. Chap-
man eds. 1967).
4. Dahrendorf, On the Origin of Social lnequali y, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
88, 108-09 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1962).
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property, and that the government and character of this country are
going to ruin."5 Even the liberal journalist E.L. Godkin, on migrating
to America and surveying the mild movement toward equality or miti-
gation of gross inequalities, lamented that the pursuit of "equality of
conditions on which the multitude seems now entering, and the eleva-
tion of equality of conditions into the rank of the highest political
good" would "prove fatal to art, to science, to literature and to law. ' 6
A generation later, in 1893, an influential jurist, Justice David Brewer
of the Supreme Court, addressed the New York State Bar Association.
Brewer remarked on another occasion that "if the Almighty should
come and say to me that I must enter the kingdom of heaven, there is
something in my Anglo-Saxon spirit which would stiffen my spinal col-
umn until it was like an iron ramrod, and force from my lips the reply,
'I won't.'" Fortunately, in assessing the movement toward equality,
Scripture and Saxon spirit reinforced each other. In Brewer's words:
"To him that hath shall be given, is the voice of Scripture; 'from him
that hath shall be taken' is the watchword of a not inconsiderable, and
through the influx of foreign population, a growing portion of our vot-
ers."7 (Was Brewer impeached? On the contrary, he received a stand-
ing ovation and was elected an honorary member of the Bar
Association.)
Perhaps Justice Brewer was exemplifying, in an anticipatory way, the
recent witticism of Professor Ralf Dahrendorf that "all men are equal
before the law but they are no longer equal after it."' A perfectly egali-
tarian society, Dahrendorf adds, would be the home "either of terror or
of absolute boredom." And "the perfectly egalitarian society is not
only unrealistic, it is a terrible idea."9
II.
The reference to law as the source of inequality brings me back to
my central theme. The point about law is simply that inequality de-
rives not merely from a division of labor or functions, but from the
establishment of norms and corresponding evaluations of persons:
again, the cardinal problem of groupings. It is like saying that raw data
5. Letter from James Kent to Moss Kent, reprinted in MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES
KENT 218 (1898).
6. J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 206 (1978).
7. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REPORTS 37, 46 (1893).
8. Dahrendort; supra note 4, at 102.
9. Id at 109.
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may exist before language, but after it the data are cooked-put into
conceptual categories more or less adequate for the purpose at hand
and continually subject to reformulation. Normative categories from
comparative evaluation resemble conceptual categories for description;
universal equality of humankind would be like undifferentiated reality
("everything that is the case"). We go, in fact, beyond evaluation and
description, respectively; we want to change things for the better, and to
predict and control more inclusively. Why we are moved to do these
things is perhaps to ask what it means to be human or, in more contem-
porary terms, whether in the process of natural selection these activities
have survival value for the human species.
However that may be, we do seek reasons, and it is time to ask what
reasons can be given, despite all the misgivings that have been ex-
pressed about universal equality, for commending it in some sense as a
high moral ideal.
If we stipulate, as a premise of rational thought, that like cases
should be treated alike and unlike cases treated differently, the ques-
tion arises whether and why persons should be regarded as in like case
qua persons. The Stoics put it pithily in the most concise yet compre-
hensive statement of all, which seems to express a sense of species iden-
tity, like the Great Chain of Being, with man somewhere between
angels and beasts: "No man is so like unto himself as each is like to
all." Hobbes suggested that equality rests on the equal vulnerability of
all persons to be killed while asleep, though the consequence of this for
purposes of justice, as distinguished from self-defense, is not readily
apparent. One tradition, going back at least to the seventeenth-century
Levellers and the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalist phi-
losophers, bases equality on a common sharing of reason among
human beings. Another tradition, going back at least to the prophetic
utterances of the Old Testament and Paul's epistle to the Galatians,
bases equality on the common fatherhood of God, if not indeed on a
common human ancestry.'"
It is worth noting, however, that these premises have yielded oppo-
site conclusions. While everyone has a modicum of rationality, that
criterion can lead, as it did Aristotle, to the conclusion that differences
in the degree of reasoning faculty are more significant than the minimal
similarity. Likewise, the spiritual criterion has led some to justify
10. See Benn, Equality: Moral and Social, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (P. Edwards
ed. 1967) 38, 39.
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corthly inequality as but an interlude on the way to everlasting equality
or reward in heaven. Indeed, a spiritual equality of another sort-a
common innate depravity-has led to a doctrine of salvation by grace,
,Ahich may be reflected in the preferred position of the elect even in
carthly life.
Perhaps it would be more to the point, rather than stressing the spiri-
It U mystery or the somewhat arrogant claim of reason, to focus on the
common element of human ignorance-uniquely conscious igno-
rance-about the most important questions of existence: whence the
Universe came, why we are here, whither it and we go. The idea of
cqaality has about it a feeling of humility, not pride; it characteristi-
c.ally serves the cause of protest against domination, oppression, and
misery. The foundations of such a view of humankind rest in sympa-
thy, empathy, and compassion, though equality and the difference-
principle of helping the worst-off may be derived by the egalitarian
philosopher by setting just the right conditions for the veil of ignorance
behind which a rational choice in speculative self-interest will be made.
Are there any areas where equality extends, or should extend, uni-
'ersally-where all human beings are, or should be, treated alike?
Such a claim is sometimes made for "basic liberties," as distinguished
t rom the allocation of goods. "Basic liberties" may be thought of as
,r-ocedure-formal equality before the law; as interests of particpa-
wi11-political equality; and as interests ofpersonhood--equality of re-
spect for autonomy in essential matters of selfhood." I believe, for
reasons that can be developed, that claims of universality fall short
even in these areas-e.g., an enemy spy is not entitled to the same pro-
cedural safeguards as a friendly alien or a citizen; a non-resident suitor
may have to post bond while a resident may not; etc., etc. In the area of
participation the inequalities are (justifiably) even greater. Indeed,
within this area itself there are distinctions to be drawn such as between
qualifications to hold office, to vote, and to speak (e.g., in the matter of
age). What is true is that as the degree of equality is maximized, the
conditions of defeasance are more closely scrutinized.
It is sometimes said that there is at least a principle of equal consid-
eration that applies universally: each individual counts alike as one for
purposes of having his claim considered and, even more strongly, hav-
mig his claimed weighed in a utilitarian calculus if that mode of deci-
'ston is being employed. But "consideration" is used here in two senses,
II Ste generall Freund, The Judcial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 493.
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one weak, one strong. If an East Indian and an American Indian both
claim that they are being slighted in the benefits of American tax ex-
penditures, the East Indian's claim presumably will be disposed of with
a different kind of "consideration" from the American Indian's. Call
the difference what you will-threshold versus ultimate; "standing"
versus "on the merits;" summary versus plenary. To talk of equality of
consideration is possible only because of the imprecise meaning of the
word without the appropriate qualifier. Classification and weighting
are manifestly still at work, not just because of different outcomes but
because of a difference in the kind of attention given, dependent on
asking the status of the claimant. To say that consideration is given
because attention is paid is paradoxical. We would have to say that we
were giving equal consideration to men and women if, in order to elim-
inate women, we considered the gender of two candidates named
Vivian.
What can be conceded is that in matters of procedure and participa-
tion there is the greatest approach to equality, even though groupings
are by no means dispensed with. Why should this maximization occur
in these areas? First, a cynical answer would be that here equality car-
ries the least cost, and so others can afford to be egalitarian here while
holding fast to privileged positions in material wealth. A more respect-
ful way of putting this would be to argue that such attributes as a fair
trial or political participation are open ended, so that one person's in-
clusion does not negate or reduce another's share. But this is not
strictly true. To furnish a lawyer to an indigent litigant not only adds
to the tax burden, but reduces the advantage of the more affluent oppo-
nent. An enlarged suffrage dilutes the weight of the previously estab-
lished electorate. Second, matters of procedure and participation are
more easily administered, especially by law and certainly by the courts,
than redistribution of material wealth, and in America at least we have
tended, for better or worse, to look to courts for ethical standards. But,
of course, the limits of law do not define moral choice. Third, a con-
tractarian theory of social morality, deriving from the idea of reciproc-
ity, finds participation to be a basic element in the moral structure, the
underpinning of obedience and sacrifice. Finally, in a practical way,
too, participation is the matrix, the foundation of other forms of equal-
ity, at least in our society. Voting, and political power in general, can
produce egalitarian reforms in the economic and social realm. A prin-
cipal ground for upholding the law giving the suffrage to citizens not
literate in English who had a sixth-grade education in a Spanish-lan-
[Vol. 1979:11
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guage school was to provide a political lever for bringing about a more
equitable distribution of public services.' 2 It is interesting that the
Supreme Court's opinion dealt first with this instrumental value, treat-
ing equal material distribution as the end, before discussing the intrin-
sic equality of the voting qualifications themselves. Moreover, Chief
Justice Warren conjectured more than once that if malapportionment
of legislative bodies had been remedied earlier, the school segregation
problem would have been resolved by political means.' 3 However
doubtful the hypothesis, the fact that it is at least plausible indicates the
potential energy of political equality.
Of course, political power and economic strength are reciprocal. Po-
litical power is fostered by economic and social power; the head of a
great corporation or a great union or a daily newspaper does not have
to rely on carrying a homemade sign in a picket line to gain the atten-
tion of his representatives in the legislature. But even making allow-
ance for the reciprocal effect of economic power, still with the help of
balance-of-power politics and increased public funding of election
campaigns, political participation is rightly perceived as a basic liberty
in practice as well as in theory.
The concept of personhood is the most problematic and amorphous
of the areas of equal basic liberties. Here, subsumed under equality,
are the competing claims of autonomy and coercion, the private and
collective spheres of choice. The abortion issue, both freedom of choice
and public subsidy, is only the most recent and dramatic example of
this field of controversy. It is obviously matter for another day, but it
does bring home the inextricable ties between equality and other moral
criteria. This is the theme with which I wish to conclude.
III.
The reason we are interested in the idea of equality is that it figures
in moral decision. In that functional context I would make three
points: the problem of equality is that of choosing for comparison the
appropriate grouping-whether the appropriate unit is the individual
or some category of individuals; second, a question of equality is en-
meshed with other ideals, which may be other competing claims of
equality, other values such as liberty, or other norms such as authority
(who should decide); third, a question of equality is also enmeshed for
12. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
13. See Ely, The Chief 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974).
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decision in the concrete conditions of a given society. I want to deal
briefly with each of these points.
A. The appropriate unit should be relevant to its purpose.
The purpose may be symbolized by the polling place, the courtroom,
the hospital, the schoolroom. In each of these the problem of equality
of treatment is compounded because the appropriate or relevant group-
ing may depend on whether the purpose of the enterprise is primarily
to provide an opportunity or to produce a certain outcome. Not only
must the grouping be relevant to its purpose (compare a labor union as
the sole agent for its members in collective bargaining and in political
elections), it must be representative of a common interest (not over-
inclusive or underinclusive) and must provide equality of access to
membership and participatory equality in its internal processes.
Wheels within wheels of equality. Two major questions arise in judg-
ing the appropriateness-the relevance and representativeness-of
classifications.
First, are there different degrees of strictness to be applied in assess-
ing different grounds of classification? Are there, that is, certain classi-
fications that are "suspect," that require more than ordinary
justification? The Supreme Court has variously specified as suspect
classifications, calling for strict judicial scrutiny, those based on race,
alienage, or legitimacy of birth.'4 Does this classification of classifica-
tions have any pertinence for the primary classifiers-legislators or
others--or only for the judges who judge the classifiers?
The answer depends on the reasons for the suspect character of a
classification. The possible reasons giving rise to a rebuttable presump-
tion of arbitrary grouping are these: a history of biased hostility toward
the disfavored group; the irrelevance, in general, of the distinguishing
characteristic to any legitimate social policy; and the relative political
impotence and, hence, vulnerability of the group. The last rea-
son-political impotence-is of special pertinence to a court reviewing
a legislative judgment; while it is not irrelevant at the stage of legisla-
tive consideration, there it would be an appeal to resist the hydraulic
pressures operating on the process itself. The other reasons for strict
scrutiny-historical prejudice and general irrationality-are as fully
pertinent for the primary decisionmakers as for the courts.
Second, if a classification is based on race, for example, but gives
14. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1976).
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preference to the historically disadvangated group, is it nevertheless
-suspect," so that it must be justified by compelling reasons? I would
not have thought so, in light of the reasons for the strict standard, were
it not that in the Bakke" case the four-member opinion supporting
preferential admissions conceded that strict scrutiny was called for.16
These four Justices maintained that compensation for past discrimina-
tion-whether by the institution in question or by society at large-met
the strict standard of compelling interest, an interest in making amends
for a past wrong, in securing a diversified student body, and in the
more effective delivery of professional services. Though not constitu-
tionally compelled, these Justices concluded, preferential admissions
were constitutionally permitted.
Granted that the preference is pragmatically useful, is it intrinsically
unfair? More specifically, if society was responsible for the discrimina-
tion, why should relatively innocent persons bear the burden of rectifi-
cation? To answer that question, it is pertinent to note that we are not
attaching a stigma of guilt; the burden is more like that of an innocent
donee of stolen property who is asked to make restitution lest he profit
from another's wrong at the expense of an innocent victim. Still, are
presently rejected applicants the donees of benefits conferred by the
discriminatory social system? In fact, they are if the whole society is
viewed as affected in immeasurable ways by a pervasive system of seg-
regation and inferior treatment in employment opportunities, educa-
tion, housing, and public services. Still, why is it not the responsibility
of the whole society to make compensation, as by taxation for remedial
programs? This is, to be sure, one response. But great social advances
commonly cause more pointed dislocations where the new configura-
tion cuts across the old, as where landowners adjoining residential
property taken for a playground suffer an uncompensated loss of trade,
quiet, and association." Thus, the shock of rejection may be tempered
by the shock of recognition.
15. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-07 (1976) (applying an apparently intermedi-
ate standard of scrutiny to invalidate a law treating men more severely than women), with the
critical comments of Stevens, J., concurring, id at 210-1i, and Rehnquist, J., dissenting, id at 220-
21.
17. Elsewhere I have discussed more fully the problem of racial preference. See Freund,
Equahlo . Race, and Preferential Treatment, in SMALL COMFORTS FOR HARD TIMEs 26 (M.
Mooney & F. Stuber eds. 1977); On the Bakke Case, NIEMAN REPORTS 3 (Win./Spr. 1978).
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B. A question of equality is generally enmeshed with other ideals and
entitlements, decision cannot rest on equality in isolation, and
indeed, the norm of equality maypoint ambiguously. "
Let me illustrate with a recent case. The Massachusetts constitution
forbids corporations to expend corporate funds to influence a popular
referendum on a subject that does not have a material effect on the
corporation's affairs-in this instance, a referendum on a progressive
individual income tax: Certain banking corporations challenged this
prohibition as repugnant to the guarantee of freedom of expression in
the Federal Constitution. The highest court of Massachusetts sustained
the law, in which considerations of equality play a conspicuous part. I '
In exercising a basic political liberty such as persuading or voting in
a public election, each person has an inalienable right to count as one;
autonomy is the watchword. Shareholders can be protected against the
use of their assets to promote a cause in which they may not believe.
Moreover, the managers of the aggregated wealth of a corporation
would have a disproportionate political power if they could employ
that wealth in a political contest against a position dependent on indi-
vidual contributions. Thus, protection of political minorities and re-
straints on leveraged power carried the day in the state court;
individual rights prevailed, or so it seemed. In the United States
Supreme Court the decision was reversed by a five-to-four vote. 20 Now
the emphasis was on the right to hear, the right to a free flow of infor-
mation and opinion, in order that the referendum would reflect the best
judgment of individual voters. The emphasis shifted from output, so to
speak, to input; from diffusion of individual expression to diffusion of
individual enlightenment (if that is not too polite a term for television
advertising). (Again, I should have thought the Massachusetts court's
decision was persuasive until I was set right by higher authority.)
Now, to complete the story, a variant has been presented. The Mas-
sachusetts constitution impliedly prohibits municipalities from spend-
ing public funds to influence a referendum-this time, on an issue of
classification of property for property tax purposes. Despite the
Supreme Court decision, the Massachusetts court was unregenerate. It
18. See Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128 (F. Olafson ed.
1961).
19. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney General, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977),
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (White. Brennan, Marshall & Rehnquist.
JJ., dissenting).
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sustained the prohibition.2 Now there is a further dimension in the
structure of equality: if private corporations may use corporate assets
for this purpose, does not the principle of equal treatment dictate a
similar right on the part of municipal corporations? There is, of course,
a difference: dissenting shareholders in a private corporation can more
readily withdraw their funds than a dissenting resident can withdraw
from the tax rolls ("I do not think I shall join the Inland Revenue this
year," said the English lord.) Whether this is a pivotal distinction we
will presumably learn in due course.22 It is enough for the moment to
point out the tangled web of equality.
C. A question of equality is enmeshed also in the concrete conditions
o1a society.
It is not easy to reduce to a formula the nagging dilemmas of choice
for moral man in an immoral society. The twin vices of abstractness
and absolutism can make our thinking unresponsive to realities. John
Dewey pointed to the danger in his Reconstruction in Philosophy:23
What we want light upon is this or that group of individuals, this or
that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social ar-
rangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic
substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical re-
lationship to one another. The discussion goes on in terms of the state,
the individual, the nature of institutions as such, society in general.
We need guidance in dealing with particular perplexities in domestic
life, and are met by dissertations on the Family or by assertions of the
sacredness of individual Personality. We want to know about the worth
of the institution of private property as it operates under given conditions
of definite time and place. We meet with the reply of Proudhon that
property generally is theft, or with that of Hegel that the realization of
will is the end of all institutions, and that private ownership as the expres-
sion of mastery of personality over physical nature is a necessary element
in such realization. Both answers may have a certain suggestiveness in
21. Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978), stay granted, 99 S. Ct. 50
(078).
22. On January 8, 1979, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question. City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 822 (1979). Justices Brennan, Blackmun
and Powell would have set the case for argument. Presumably, the dismissal rested on the posi-
tion that a municipal corporation, as a creature of the state, cannot complain on federal grounds
that state law compels it to refrain from spending for certain purposes. It was for this reason that
three Justices (Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.) dissented from an earlier denial of a motion to
%vacate a stay in the case. 99 S. Ct. 346, 347 (1978).
23. J. DEWEY, RECONSTRUcTION IN PHILOSOPHY 188-89, 198 (enlarged ed. 1948).
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connection with specific situations. But the conceptions are not proffered
for what they may be worth in connection with special historic phenom-
ena. They are general answers supposed to have a universal meaning that
covers and dominates all particulars. Hence they do not assist inquiry.
They close it. They are not instrumentalities to be employed and tested in
clarifying concrete social difficulties. They are ready-made principles to
be imposed upon particulars in order to determine their nature ...
The waste of mental energy due to conducting discussion of social af-
fairs in terms of conceptual generalities is astonishing ...
Concretely, then, consider the application of the maxim in principle,
first, to the case in which the worst-off are miserable and the gap to the
next higher group is great, and next, to the case in which the worst-off
are comfortable and the gap is small. The choice between using given
resources to improve the poorest group by a little and the equally siza-
ble next highest group by a large amount may appear differently in the
two different social contexts. Or, if the unemployment rate is two per-
cent and the inflation rate twenty percent, and heroic measures of taxa-
tion and coercion will reduce unemployment to 1.8 percent, while
modest measures will reduce inflation to four percent (mirabile dicu),
can we say confidently that the only rational and just choice is the at-
tack on unemployment? As natural rights are a constraint on utilitarian
ethics, may not utilitarian considerations serve as a proper constraint
on natural law absolutes?
I have not spoken particularly of equality of opportunity, as distinct
from equality in a more ultimate sense. Equality of opportunity in the
real world does not provide an escape from the moral issues of inequal-
ity. To Thomas Jefferson equality of opportunity depended on the dis-
tribution of land; distributive justice is the inescapable problem
anterior to equality of opportunity, just as it may also aggravate the
problem as the process unfolds. Equality of opportunity is pursued
within a social ordering that conditions the pursuit, which in turn af-
fects the social ordering for better or worse, and the whole process con-
tinually invites our intervention in the name of social justice.
Thus, equality of opportunity as a norm of social action is open to
challenge from two opposite sides. Philosophers of the free market,
like Friedrich von Hayek, who would limit equality to formal neutral
rules for the market and the law, see in the enforced equality of oppor-
tunity a doctrinal device to justify more tinkering and control, more
coercion and distortion-all the more insidious because more inno-
[Vol. 1979:11
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cently garbed.24 On the other hand, democratic socialists like R.H.
Tawney have seen in the principle of equality of opportunity an at-
tempt to evade the responsibility of moral decision regarding ultimate
equality and inequality-an attempt, moreover, that intensifies the cru-
elties of competition and leads in practice to domination and inequality
feeding upon itself.25
The greatest appeal of equality of opportunity is in the law, and es-
pecially constitutional law, with its emphasis on negative restraints, the
removal of unjust barriers, and its corresponding inadequacies as a
maker of budgets and provider of material goods.26 My final word
must be that constitutional law is not all of law, and law is not all of
life.
24. "Attractive as the phrase of equality of opportunity at first sounds, once the idea is ex-
tended beyond the facilities which for other reasons have to be provided by government, it be-
comes a wholly illusory ideal, and any attempt concretely to realize it apt to produce a
nightmare." F. Hayek, The Mirage of SocialJusice, in 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 84-85
11476).
25. R, TAWNEY, EQUALITY 119-37 (1931). The elegant ascerbity of the pre-World War II
English socialist is worth savoring: equality of opportunity may be called "the tadpole philoso-
phy, since the consolation which it offers for social evils consists in the statement that exceptional
individuals can succeed in evading them." Id at 127. "[T]he chasm which separated the elect
I rom the mass of the population ... was an indispensable incentive to economic effort and moral
%irtue among the poor. It was a guarantee that the civilization of the rich would not be destroyed
by its too promiscuous extension to classes incapable of it." Id.
More recently, Bernard Williams has similarly placed equality of opportunity in opposition to
equality of respect, in an exceptionally thoughtful essay: "This conflict . . exists today in the
feeling that a thorough-going emphasis on equality of opportunity must destroy a certain sense of
common humanity which is itself an ideal of equality." Williams, The Ideal of Equality, in PHI-
LOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 110, 129.
26. See generaly Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
lites of Constitutional Equality; 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
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